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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Research on the topic of distribution of foreign aid among recipients is regaining 
momentum. This is understandable in the light of the knowledge that presently the 
richest 40 percent of the developing world receives twice as much aid per capita as the 
poorest 40 percent [UNDP (1994)], while once upon a time foreign aid was sought to 
accomplish exactly the opposite. 
The distribution of official development assistance (ODA) is conventionally 
studied in terms of two models: the ‘recipient needs’ model and the ‘donor interest’ 
model. In the first, foreign aid flows are seen to satisfy the socio-economic needs of the 
recipient countries. In the second, national interests of donors, whether these are 
military, political or commercial, are seen to determine the direction and size of the 
foreign aid. 
Empirical studies were made to ascertain and understand whether, on balance, 
foreign aid is motivated by recipient need or donor interest. There is one class of studies, 
for example, Mcgillivray (1989), which estimates for donors a compound measure of 
their allocation bias. The other class of studies, i.e., Maizels and Nissanke (1984) and 
Grilli and Riess (1992), employs regression analysis to explain allocation of foreign aid 
by representative variables of recipient need and donor interest. 
Because the primary pursuit of these studies was to give an overall judgement on 
foreign aid motivations, insufficient attention was given to differentiations among 
donors, between recipients, and over time. The allocation policies of donors can be 
observed to differ between large donors and small donors, whereby the two types of 
donors are often tied to different groups of recipient countries. Moreover, other 
arguments than recipient need and donor interest, such as historic and geographical ties 
and the changing world political order, play important roles. 
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This paper elaborates on and extends the above two classes of studies quoted to 
consider the differentiation between donor types. In Sections 2 and 3, we shall show 
some empirical results for a small donor like The Netherlands, vis-à-vis larger donors, 
and examine the most recent trends of ODA of this country. Section 4 will briefly 
present the case for looking at foreign aid allocations as transactions with economic and 
non-economic aspects in a segmented international context and with specific recipients 
tied to specific donors. Finally, we comment on several implications. 
 
2.  COMPOUND MEASURES OF DONOR MOTIVES 
McGillivray (1989) developed a measure of the progressiveness of the aid of a 
particular donor, i. Aid progressiveness is seen as the extent to which the donor willingly 
chooses a geographical distribution of its aid which gives more aid to the poorest and 
most needy among the recipients, j=1,...,J. The criteria for the poorest and most needy 
are income per head and population size. Countries with lower income per head and 
bigger populations are assumed to require more aid. The developed measure, which can 
be called donor motive coefficient, is denoted by DMCit, for donor i in year t, and is 
defined in terms of aid, AID, population, POP, and income per capita, Y, as follows: 
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(AIDij/POPj)t = aid disbursed by donor i, and received by recipient j, expressed 
per head of recipient j, in year t; 
Wjt = weight of the recipient j relative to other recipients, in year t; 
and 
Yj, Ymin, Ymax = GNP per head of recipient country j, lowest GNP per head of 
all recipient countries, and highest GNP per head of all 
recipient countries, respectively. 
 
It follows from the above definition of DMC that the value of this coefficient is 
the highest for the donor who follows a progressive distribution and the lowest for the 
donor who distributes its aid regressively to the recipients. A value of DMCi = 1.0 is 
realised if the motivations behind aid of donor i crystallise in the allocation of all its aid 
to the poorest recipient, such a country having a low income per head and a large 
population, in which case the allocation term in Equation (1) would equal one and the  
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weight term Wj would equal one too. A value of zero is obtained for DMCi in case the 
donor i allocates all its aid to the richest recipient, such a country having a high income 
per head and a small population.  
McGillivray calculated the donor motive coefficient for OECD donor countries 
for 1969–84, and obtained the averages, the highest and the lowest values over the 
whole period, as in Table 1. It is noted that the score for the larger donor countries is 
between .64 and .86; these include the USA, FRG, Italy, France, Japan, and UK, while 
the score for the smaller donor countries ranges between .88 and .94, including the four 
Scandinavian countries, two Benelux countries, Switzerland, and Canada. 
 
Table 1 
Donor Motive Coefficient DMCi 
(Value of one indicates a perfectly progressive allocation of foreign aid) 
Large Donors USA FRG Italy France Japan UK   Average 
Average 
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Highest Year .85 .86 .94 .85 .91 .92   .89 
Lowest Year .44 .67 .46 .71 .68 .79   .62 
Results 


















































Highest Year .93 .92 .92 .93 .95 .94 1.00 .98 .95 
Lowest Year .80 .75 .77 .77 .90 .91 .88 .89 .83 
Results 



















Source: Rows 1, 2, 3 from McGillivray (1989). 
 Rows 4 summarises results from our own calculations for 1992-93, calculated from data on foreign aid given in OECD 
(1994), and data on income per capita from the World Bank. Recipient countries with populations below one million 
were excluded from the application. 
 
The results are indicative of different motivations behind the groups of large and 
small donors, the large donors appearing to be regressive in their foreign aid allocations, 
while the smaller donors appearing to promote progressive allocations. 
We have applied the exercise for 1992-93, giving results in the fourth row. In 
these applications, it is noted that the proportion of total ODA covered by the term AIDi 
is different per donor i. This was also the case in McGillivray. For most donors, the 
coverage was about 70 percent or above of the ODA with the exception of Sweden and 
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France, where the published ODA data allowed a coverage of 64 and 40 percent, 
respectively. 
The results obtained for 1992-93 show that the donor motive coefficient for the 
large donors is biased towards regressive allocations—average value 0.81—as compared 
to that of small donors who allocate their aid more progressively—average value 0.95. 
The very well observed difference in the distribution pattern between large and small 
donors can be looked upon as the result of contrasting motives, with donor interest 
dominant among the large members of DAC and recipient needs among the small 
members. But other interpretations, which we shall address in a later section, are 
plausible. In both cases, there has been, on the average, a change over the years towards 
a more equitable distribution of foreign aid to recipients, which can be due to a 
relaxation in political confrontations among western donors, and in particular among the 
larger donors. 
 
3.   REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DONOR INTEREST 
AND RECIPIENT NEEDS 
In a comprehensive study of the issue, Maizels and Nissanke (1984) fitted cross-
country regressions to foreign aid received by some 80 developing countries in 1969-70 
and 1979-80. In a stepwise regression they used, on the one hand, explanatory variables 
representing the recipient needs (GDP per capita, GNP growth, trade deficit, population, 
and relative shortfalls in basic needs), and on the other hand, variables belonging to the 
sphere of donor interest such as arms transfer, regional interest, private investment, and 
strategic imports. The results for the major bilateral aid donors, summarised in Table 2, 
show that the motivations are heavily dominated by donor interest, for the USA and 
France practically entirely so, while for the UK, Japan, and the FRG to lesser extents. 
The results indicated also that additional explorations, beyond recipient needs and donor 
interests, are required. 
 
Table 2 
Relative Importance of Recipient Needs and Donor Interest in the 
Foreign Aid of Large Donors, 1979-80 
 USA FRG France Japan UK 
Adjusted R2 0.97 0.56 0.89 0.38 0.63 
Percentage of Explained  
  Variance Due to: 
     
  Recipient Needs % 0.1 31.6 1.6 18.9 9.8 
  Donor Interest % 99.9 68.4 98.4 81.1 90.2 
Source:  Maizels and Nissanke (1984).  
A later study by Grilli and Riess (1992) for members of the European 
Community (EC) for 1971–88 confirms the findings that the distribution of bilateral 
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foreign aid to recipients has been largely driven by the commercial interests of the major 
donors of the EC. 
We shall now investigate how far cross-section regressions for the small donor 
countries give contrasting results to those so far found for the large donor countries. We 
have selected the case of The Netherlands for this examination. The period examined for 
this small donor will be that of 1968-88, which is longer than but encompasses the 
period for which the larger donors were studied. 
The two official objectives of Dutch Development Cooperation (DDC), as explicitly 
defined in 1983-84, were: (1) poverty alleviation and (2) strengthening of the economy in 
order to enhance self-reliance. These two lines of policy were and are still thought to be 
interrelated; structural poverty alleviation is regarded as being conditional on strengthening 
of the economy, whereas growth is necessary to alleviate poverty. Since then these 
objectives were elaborated to include female participation and environmental conservation. 
The machinery for allocating Dutch foreign aid is the Directorate General of 
International Cooperation, which forms part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But, 
allocational decisions cannot be taken fully in isolation from what happens in other 
departments within the Ministry, and in several other ministries. Allocational decisions 
have also to consider parliamentary opinion; the same goes for public opinion. Pressure 
groups and lobbying circles play a significant role, too. Finally, even the Directorate 
itself cannot be regarded as a coherent unit. For instance, the multilateral programme is 
carried out more or less separately from the other programmes. Furthermore, since the 
organisation of bilateral assistance takes place at the level of regional country desks, 
these desks are known to compete energetically, successes and failures in reallocations 
very often tied to the person in office and the ambassador in the recipient’s capital. 
In terms of ODA as a percentage of the GNP, the Dutch figure was 0.81 percent 
in 1993, down from 0.86 percent in 1992; which is still among the highest of the DAC 
countries. The bilateral assistance programme constitutes a large category of Dutch 
foreign aid, about 20 percent. In the eighties, there used to be extensive and long-term 
cooperation with 10 so-called concentration countries and 4 regions, viz., the Sahel, 
Southern Africa, Central America, and the Andes region. The concentration countries 
were Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, North Yemen, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Kenya, 
Sudan, and Tanzania. Apart from this, there is a special development relationship with 
Suriname.1 Because the explanatory models which will be developed in this paper will 
be restricted to the bilateral allocations, it is not necessary to discuss the other categories 
of foreign aid, although decisions on these may sometimes have a bearing on the 
distribution of bilateral assistance programmes for the recipient countries. A more 
elaborate study of such matters is reported in Cohen and De Jong (1990). 
We shall restrict our analysis to explaining allocations to the ten countries 
 1Although the recent Dutch policy document gives explicit reasons for concentrating aid on a limited 
number of countries, yet the concentration policy of the eighties has been somewhat relaxed and the bilateral 
assistance goes currently to 56 countries. 
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mentioned, which have been concentration countries throughout 1968–88, or at least 
during the greater part of this period. These countries were not removed from the list of 
concentration countries when a policy revision took place in the early 1980s. Aid 
received by each of these ten countries for the 21 individual years form the data-set for 
testing two equations. One equation aims at explaining the absolute level of foreign aid 
received by the recipient country, AIDjt and the other is for explaining a recipient 
country’s annual share in the annual total allocation to the ten recipients, AIDjt /∑ AIDjt. 
The explanatory variables belong either to the recepient country and are meant to 
represent the degree of need for assistance; or to the donor country, indicating donor 
interests in aid disbursement. There is also a third category of neutral variables, which 
help in explaining the allocations but do not relate to recipient need or donor interest. 
There are two variables representing the recipient needs. POPj,t–1 is the one-year 
lagged population. The expectation is that the higher the population, the more aid 
allocations will be made to the country concerned. Yj,t–1 is the one-year lagged level of 
GDP per capita in US dollars. The expectation is that the higher the income per capita, 
the less need there is to allocate aid to the country in question. 
The analysis includes two explanatory variables of finance and trade which 
represent donor interest. DSRj,t–1 is the one-year lagged debt-service ratio. Here one might 
expect a positive sign if it is assumed that a lower capacity of a country to service its debts 
will be an incentive to provide more assistance. Countries which have difficulties to service 
their debts are often involved in stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes of the 
IMF and the World Bank, however. Because such aid is given multilaterally and because 
the recipient is often seen in such situations to be less credible, donor interest is served by 
less involvement of the recipient in the bilateral programme. In that case, the expected sign 
is negative. The other variable is EXPj,t–1, the one-year lagged Dutch exports to country j. It 
is generally assumed that aid transfers stimulate exports from the donor country [Marsden 
and Roe (1983)]. If the past level of Dutch exports to a recipient is already high, the 
opportunities to raise this level further are likely to be more limited than in the case of a 
lower past level, and from this point of view a donor is expected to be less inclined to 
provide assistance. For this reason, the expected sign is negative. It is also possible to 
maintain that aid commitment is an effective means of raising donor exports to the recipient 
via tied aid or contractual promotion. Once the penetration of donor exports is achieved, 
there may be less urge to increase aid. Such behaviour will also lead to a negative sign. 
Note that from the point of view of the recipient, it can be argued that a higher level of 
imports from the Netherlands may be an indication that the country in question is more 
capable of financing its imports on its own, so there will be less need to receive aid. 
A few other variables are included to neutralise the data set. These variables are 
neutral in the sense that they do not belong to either donor interest or recipient need. 
NNI is net national income of the Netherlands at market prices. This variable is 
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necessary to capture the capacity to provide assistance by the donor. The expected sign 
is positive. Furthermore, POL is a dummy variable to represent the policy reorientation 
of 1975, whereby Egypt, North Yeman, Sri Lanka and Sudan acquired the status of a 
concentration country, and the allocations to most of the other countries were revised 
downwards. The pre-1975 dummy takes the value 1; otherwise zero. The expected sign 
is negative. Finally, IND is a dummy variable to account for the special, historically 
determined, relationship with Indonesia; Indonesia = 1, other = 0. 
Selected results from the first set of regression analysis are presented in Table 3. 
The first regression shows the recipient’s population to explain about 53 percent of the 
variance in the allocations among recipients. Including the level of the GDP per capita 
raised the adjusted R2 somewhat, but the regression coefficient for the GDP per capita 
showed a wrong sign. The performance of the regression improved somewhat more 
when such donor interest variables of the debt-service ratio and exports are incorporated. 
All effects of the four regressed variables now have the right Signs. 
The largest improvement occurs when neutral variables are introduced as in 
regression (5). All coefficients are found to be significant and have the expected sign, 
whereas another 30 percentage points are added to the adjusted R2. 
The results seem to confirm that the official objectives of Dutch bilateral assistance, 
which coincide with recipient needs, are indeed the primary determinants of the allocational 
policies, able to explain about 55 out of 100 cases. Donor interest as represented by the 
debt-service ratio and exports plays a very secondary role and is able to add only a little 
more to the explanation, the equivalent of some 5 percent of the cases. Neutral variables, 
which were very often ignored in the studies of foreign aid motivations, are found to be 
significant in explaining the equivalent of another 30 percent of the cases. 
Turning to the second set of regression analysis, which explains the allocational 
shares to the recipient countries over time, AIDjt /∑j AIDjt, it is necessary to write some of the 
explaining variables as shares to suit this set of regressions. Among the recipient needs 
variables, the population variable POPj,t–1 is re-expressed as country j’s share in the total 
population of all countries j, thus (POPj /∑j POPj)t–1. The variable of Yj,t–1 remains the same. 
The donor interest variable of exports is re-expressed as country j’s share in the total export 
of the Netherlands to countries j, thus (EXPj /∑j EXPj)t–1. DSRj,t–1 remains the same. The 
neutral values are restricted to two dummy variables of POL and IND, and remain the same. 
Regression (1) shows the relevance of the recipient needs model, Table 4. The 
share of population of the recipient, in the total population of the 10 concentration 
countries, is shown to explain about 40 percent of the variance. In contrast, the GDP per 
capita in regression (2) did not offer any additional explanation. 
With reference to the donor interest variables, regressions (3) and (4) show an 
improvement in the adjusted R2 with the introduction of the debt-service ratio and the 
export share, but the regression coefficients do not have the expected sign, which 
weakens the case for a donor interest argument. 
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Table 3 
Explaining the Absolute Allocation of Dutch Bilateral 
Assistant to Ten Recipients for the Years 1968–1988 













Recipient Need  
  Variables 
     










   Income per Capita  









Donor Interest  
  Variables 
     
   Debt Service Ratio  
     DSRj,t–1 










Neutral Variables,  
  Dummies 
     
  Net National Income  
     Netherlands NNI 
    0.301 
(8.97) 
  Policy Reorientation  
    Year POL 
    –22.119 
(–4.10) 
  Special Relation  
    Indonesia IND 
    100.156 
(18.71 
Regression Statistics      
   Adjusted R2 .525 .560 .567 .599 .905 
Sources: GDP and population in variables come from the Penn World Table (Mark 4); debt-service ratios are 
taken from World Bank, World Debt Tables; Export figures from IMF, Directions of Trade Statistics 
yearbook; net national income from Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics, Nationale Rekeningen 
(National Accounts). 
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Table 4 
Explaining the Allocational Shares of Dutch Bilateral 
Assistance to Ten Recipients for the Years 1970–1988 
AIDjt /∑j AIDjt = a + b (POPj /∑j POPj)t–1 + c Yj,t–1 + d DSRj,t–1 

















Recipient Need  
  Variables 
       
   Population Share 















    Income per Capita  













Donor Interest  
  Variables 
       
   Debt Service Ratio  
      DSRj,t–1 









   Export Share 
     (EXPj /∑j EXP)t–1 





Neutral Variables,  
  Dummies 
       
  Policy Reorientation  
    Year POL 






  Special Relation  
     Indonesia IND 






Regression Statistics        
   Adjusted R2 .396 .403 .422 .554 .730 .731 .727 
Sources: Same as Table 3. 
 
Introducing the neutralising dummies for the special relationship with Indonesia, 
IND, and for the policy reorientation of 1975, POL improved the explanatory power of 
the regression substantially and showed a correct negative sign for the export share but 
not a significant regression coefficient. Therefore, in regression (6) we excluded the 
export share, which led to an improvement of the adjusted R2 and rendered the effect of 
the debt-service ratio almost significant. To assess the effect of excluding the debt-
service ratio as well, we ran an additional regression (7). This left unaffected the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables and the adjusted R2. Thus it is appropriate to 
leave out the debt-service ratio as well. 
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The conclusion is obvious: recipient needs as represented by the population share 
and income per capita seem to be the principal determinants of the allocational shares of 
the Dutch bilateral assistance programme. Donor interest can be viewed as an irrelevant 
motive in the foreign aid allocations of a small donor country such as The Netherlands. 
Next to that historical, geographical, and cultural considerations can play a 
significant role in determining the preferences of a ‘patronising’ donor for ‘patronised’ 
recipients, and  consequently the distributional pattern of foreign aid. 
 Results of Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate the relevance of these neutralising 
factors for a country like The Netherlands, and likely for other small donors with a 
colonial history. Special relationships between a donor and a recipient hold for the larger 
donors, too, and perhaps more significantly because they can afford to. These factors 
weaken the dichotomic explanation of ODA allocations in terms of donor interest and 
recipient needs. 
4.  MUTUAL DESTINY 
The results obtained can be interpreted as giving support to the hypothesis that 
large donors follow primarily a donor interest motivation while small donors consider 
primarily the recipient needs. The problems with this interpretation are that a decision-
making context is assumed which is unified, conscious, and total. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that the decision-makers in the large and small donors have different 
motivations, or, in other words, different decision functions. Given the multi-level 
complexities of decisions on foreign aid, there is little reason to believe that there is any 
optimisation taking place, neither can some actors (small donors) be assumed to be more 
altruistic than large donors. 
A country by country look at the distribution of foreign aid will give support to 
the alternative view that there are two types of ODA allocations. The first type of 
allocation is characterised by about one-to-one coupling of a given recipient to a given 
donor, which is very much based on matters of common language, historical ties, and 
geographical location, which are further substantiated by mutual consultations between 
donors. It is well-known that the French-speaking African countries receive their ODA 
predominantly from France. Bijective links also exist between specific historical/ 
regional countries in South America as recipients, and Spain and the USA as donors. 
Furthermore, limiting the analysis to the 15 largest aid flows for each of the 24 DAC-
members, it can be stated that Australia takes care of Papua New Guinea, Italy of 
Albania, the Netherlands of Sudan, UK of Ghana, Switzerland of Jordan, etc. Table 5 
suggests that once such couplings were started for whatever reason, they are reinforced 
in time by the mutual consent of DAC members. There is an economic justification of a 
one-to-one coupling. The donor established first, particularly in a small country 
recipient,  has   much  lower  transaction  costs  than  the  other  donors. To be clear, the  
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economic justification is often embedded in a historic or geographical context, which is 
mutually endorsed by the contending donors.2 
The second type of allocations is untied, whereby more donors go to one 
recipient. The density of the concentration (number of donors in the recipient country) 
depends on the relative attractiveness of the recipient, whether this be strategic, political, 
environmental, or economic. Recipients who have gone through wars or internal 
upheavals, and where peace and stability are highly valued by the world community, 
receive more attention than others, as can be observed from the larger number of donors 
and aid per recipient population in such countries as Mozambique and Egypt with ten or 
more donors, or Nicaragua and Somalia with somewhat less donors. These are 
strategically attractive countries. 
Among recipients which in recent history were politically interesting and were 
led by highly esteemed statesmen with a development orientation are Tanzania and 
Zambia, having well above ten donors. Countries like Zimbabwe and Kenya will also fit 
here; they are also environmentally attractive to foreigners. The fact that the attractive 
leaderships which were once present are now absent does not count against the cost-
saving donor-recipient linkages which were developed in the past. Exit of the established 
donor from a particular recipient context is usually seen to be very costly and politically 
non-defendable. 
Finally, there are a number of economically significant recipients with popula-
tions of 100 millions or more, who, because of their sheer size, are and remain attractive 
to most donors. Among these countries are China (with 15 donors) and India, 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines somewhat smaller. In spite of the 
large sums of aid which these recipients get, the amount per capita and the aid/income 
percentage are among the lowest, 0.6 to 2.0 percent. Concentrations of donors in these 
recipients are a reflection of the current and expected significant roles of such countries 
as China and India in the world economy. 
A good practice in applied analysis is to clean the given statistics from distortive 
definitions. This we did to ODA statistics of 1992-93, too, giving as a result Table 5. 
According to ODA statistics, Israel is counted as a recipient (USA and Germany as the 
donors). Such ODA is of a different character. As the income per capita of Israel is 
higher than that of several DAC donors, it is high time to delete it from ODA recipients. 
Similar arguments apply for counting South Korea as a recipient (Japan is donor), as 
well as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico (USA, Spain, and Portugal are the donors). These 
 2Of course, special bilateral relations of a historic, geographic, etc., nature have been observed as early 
as 1965, and probably before. The 1965 review Development Assistance Efforts and Policies of the DAC 
(OECD) notes: “Assistance from Belgium, France, Portugal, and the United Kingdom continues to be largely 
directed to those areas and countries which had until recently, or still have, special links of a linguistic, monetary, 
or commercial character. Italy, Japan, and the Federal Republic of Germany have had flows established by 
reparations arrangements. Nevertheless, these forces of historic or geographic determinism seem to be 
weakening” (p. 41, 43). As can be verified from this paper, these forces are still very significant in explaining the 
flows. 
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countries have incomes per capita which are 50 times (or more) those of the poorest 
recipients. These countries include the newly emerging markets and thus capture a fair 
share of the world private capital flow. ODA is hardly relevant here. 
There is need to revise and limit the list of ODA recipients. Table 5 excludes 
officially recognised recipients with income per capita above $ 2000. This maximum 
income is still about 25 times that of the poorest recipient (Ymax = $2000 per capita, Ymin 
= $ 80 per capita). 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we obtained results which support the hypothesis that large donor 
countries distribute foreign aid regressively while small donors distribute progressively. 
The Netherlands, an example of a small donor, was particularly shown to have a 
progressive distribution. 
The results are interpreted by some to reflect donor interest motivations for the 
large donors and recipient needs motivations for the small donors. This interpretation is 
disputable in view of the absence of a unified, conscious or total decision-making 
framework according to which the donor operates. 
A country-by-country analysis supports a combination of evolutionary elements 
with mutual consultations between donors, cost minimisation by the donors, and 
economic prospects of the recipient; all these determining the present allocation patterns 
irrespective of which donor it is. 
 
REFERENCES 
Cohen, S. I, and N. de Jong (1990) Allocation of Dutch Development Assistance: An 
Explanatory Approach. Growth Dynamics University Institute. Paper presented to 
the VIth General Conference of the European Association of Development 
Institute, Oslo. 
Grilli, E., and M. Riess (1992), EC Aid to Associated Countries: Distribution and 
Determinants. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 128: 202–220. 
Maizels, A., and M. K. Nissanke (1984) Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries. 
World Development 12: 9 879–900. 
Marsden, K., and A. Roe (1983) The Political Economy of Foreign Aid. A World Bank 
Perspective. Labour and Society 8:1. 
McGillivray, M. (1989) The Allocation of Aid among Developing Countries: A Multi-
Donor Analysis Using a Per Capita Aid Index. World Development 17:4 561–568. 
OECD (1994) Development Cooperation. Efforts and Policies of the Development 
Assistance Committee. Paris: OECD. 
UNDP (1994) Human Development Report 1994. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
